CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-DRUNK DRIVERS HAVE No RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL-Blanton v. City of North
Las Vegas, Nevada, 109 S. Ct. 1289 (1989).

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... 1
This fundamental right has been applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 2 The question
of the right to a jury trial was first raised in 1888 when the United
States Supreme Court held that this right need not be universally
granted.3 Under the petty offense doctrine, courts have consistently held that for those crimes categorized as petty the United
States Constitution does not guarantee ajury trial.' Although no

constitutional guidelines exist, the Supreme Court has formulated various standards for classifying offenses as petty or serious. 5 This classification is more difficult when applied to the
I U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Constitution also states that "[t]he trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be
held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed .....
U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.

2 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968).
3 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552 (1888) (some minor or petty offenses may
be tried without jury). See also Note, The Petty Offense Exception and the Right to a Jury
Trial, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 205, 212-13 (1979) (tracing the origin of the petty offense exception from colonial times to present); Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the ConstitutionalGuaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 93465 (1926) [hereinafter Frankfurter] (discussing practice of summarily adjudicating
crimes punishable by minor penalties). But see Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!,
26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245 (1959) (supporting mandatory jury trial rights for all criminal offenses as intended by original framers).
4 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159 (holding that petty crimes punishable by less than six
months of incarceration may be summarily adjudicated).
5 In the federal system, 18 U.S.C. § 1 (3) (1982) defines as petty, those offenses
subject to no more than six months in prison and a fine no greater than $500.
However, this definition has not been literally adhered to in more recent decisions
such as Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975), where the Court held that a
$10,000 fine did not qualify a crime as serious for purposes of the sixth amendment
right to jury trial. Id. at 475-76. See also infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text
(analysis of Muniz).

Standards accepted by the federal courts have included common law tests
which consider whether the offense is indictable at common law, consideration of
the maximum statutory penalties, and consideration of the collateral consequences
of a conviction. Note, The FederalConstitutional Right to Trial by Jury for the Offense of
Driving While Intoxicated, 73 MINN. L. REV. 122, 129-31 (1988). The line of cases
supporting the common law test include District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S.
617 (1937); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930); Schick v. United
States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). In Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), a new
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offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, due to society's
changing views which are reflected by state legislatures' increasingly severe penalties for this offense. 6 The number of these
cases is constantly growing and, as a consequence, courts are
faced with the task of balancing the accused's fundamental right
to a jury trial against the administrative conveniences of non-jury
adjudications. 7

In the Supreme Court's determination of whether the ofstandard was stressed which focused on the length of possible imprisonment. Finally, in recent cases, the courts have emphasized that additional statutory penalties
may be so severe as to deem the crime serious, regardless of the prison term. See
Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1540
(1989).
6 See Note, supra note 5, at 122-23. Due to the grave consequences attached to
driving under the influence of alcohol, "most states have enacted more stringent
penalties for [driving while intoxicated] and have increased enforcement of these
laws. In addition, many citizens' organizations publicize and attempt to combat this
problem." Id. (footnotes omitted).
7 Id. The problem is reflected by the fact that "[d]runk driving causes at least
one-half of all highway deaths and accidents in the United States .

. The very

. .

large number of intoxicated drivers poses a constant safety threat to highway users,
and results in enormous economic losses." Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Annotation, Right to Trial by Jury in Criminal Prosecutionfor Driving While Intoxicated or Similar
Offense, 16 A.L.R. 3D 1373, 1375 (1967 and Supp. 1986) (commenting on growing
number of offenders and moral judgments attached to drunk driving by society).
The United States Bureau of Justice Statistics reported the following:
LICENSED DRIVERS AND ESTIMATED ARRESTS FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE,

BY AGE:

1975

AND

1986

[Total drivers and arrests in thousands. Represents licensed drivers and arrests for those 16 years old
and over]
1975
AGE

Drivers

Arrests

1986
Arrests per
100,000

Drivers

Arrests

drivers
Total ..............
Percent distribution ......
16-17 years old .......
18-24 years old .......
25-29 years old .......
30-34 years old .......
35-39 years old .......
40-44 years old .......
45-49 years old .......
50-54 years old .......
55-59 years old .......
60-64 years old .......
65 years old and over
X

129,671
100.0
3.7
18.9
12.9
10.3
8.5
7.9
8.0
7.9
6.8
5.7
9.5

946
100.0
1.8
25.3
15.0
12.2
10.6
9.8
8.9
7.3
4.6
2.7
1.8

729
(x)
352
979
847
867
909
904
812
675
490
347
141

158,494
100.0
2.6
15.7
13.0
12.2
10.9
8.5
6.9
6.3
6.3
5.9
11.9

Not applicable.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drunk Driving, Special Report

1,792
100.0
1.5
28.8
22.0
15.8
11.1
7.2
4.9
3.4
2.4
1.6
1.2

Arrests per
100,000
drivers
1,130
(x)
647
2,075
1,909
1,471
1,158
968
805
609
434
299
118

Percent
change in
rate,
1975-88
55
(x)
84
112
125
70
27
7
- 1
-10
- 11
-14
-16
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fense of driving while intoxicated is subject to the constitutional
guarantees of the sixth amendment, the Court has stressed the
length of possible imprisonment as the most relevant criterion.,
Because of the additional and often more onerous statutory penalties attached to this offense, however, state and federal courts
have been forced to inject into their analysis criteria of a more
subjective nature. 9 Therefore, the judiciary must examine the severity of all of the statutory penalties and decide whether the offense may be deemed serious or petty.' ° Recently, the United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the right to a jury
trial for individuals accused of driving under the influence of alcohol in Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nevada. I" The Blanton
Court held that Nevada's statutory penalties for the first-time offense of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), 2 did not
qualify the offense as serious for purposes of the sixth amendment.'" Therefore, first time offenders charged with DUI under
Nevada law do not have a federal constitutional right to a jury
trial. 14
The petitioners in Blanton, Melvin R. Blanton and Mark D.
Fraley, were each charged with their first offense of DUI by the
Municipal Court of North Las Vegas, Nevada.' 5 DUI is a misdeU.S. Bureau ofJustice Statistics, Drunk Driving, Special Report, reprintedin STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1989 (109th ed. 1989).
8 Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68-69.
9 Some of the additional statutory penalties include license revocation, community service, educational programs, treatment programs, and fines. Note, supra note
5, at 138-4 1. All the American jurisdictions provide for such varied penalties. See
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY COMMISSION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DIGEST OF STATE ALCOHOL-HIGHWAY SAFETY RELATED LEGISLATION

(4th ed.
1986), reprinted in Note, supra note 5 (listing statutory penalties for the first-time

driving while intoxicated violation). The report determined that "[m]any people,
and some courts, believe that license revocation is the most severe punishment for
the drunk driver." d. at 139 (footnote omitted). Alternatively, the report noted
that "[m]any experts consider the penalties other than imprisonment to be the
most substantial and effective punishments for drunk drivers." Id. at 141 (footnote
omitted).
10 Id. at 155.
I1 109 S. Ct. 1289 (1989).
12 Other jurisdictions, including New Jersey, refer to this offense as driving
while intoxicated (DWI). See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:4-50, 39:4-50.8 (West Supp.
1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:98, 32:414, 32:415.1 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
'3 Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1294.
14

Id. at 1291.

Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun. Court, 103 Nev. 623, 627, 748 P.2d 494,
496 (1987), aff'd sub. nom. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nevada, 109 S. Ct.
1289 (1989).
15
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meanor under Nevada law.' 6 Blanton's pretrial demand for a
jury trial was denied by the municipal court. 17 Subsequently, he
filed a pretrial petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, challenging the municipal court's
jury trial denial.'" His petition was rejected and Blanton appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada.' 9
Fraley was tried and convicted of DUI in the municipal
court.2 0 He appealed the conviction to the Nevada district court

which, only a month after the denial of Blanton's motion, remanded Fraley's case for a jury trial. 2 ' The district court held
§ 484.379 (1987) provides for punishment by imprisonment
for a minimum two days and a maximum of six months, or in the alternative, fortyeight hours of community service, and in either case, by fines between $200 and
$1,000, ninety days revocation of unrestricted driving privileges and participation
in alcohol education programs. The Nevada statute proscribes driving with a blood
alcohol reading above 0.10 percent or while "under the influence of intoxicating
liquor." Id. Nevada provides the following sanctions for DUI offenders:
1. Any person who violates the provisions of [NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 484.379]:
(a) For the first offense within 7 years, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Unless he is allowed to undergo treatment as provided in [NEV. REV.
STAT. § 484.3794], the court shall:
(1) Order him to pay tuition for an educational course on the abuse
of alcohol and controlled substances approved by the department and
complete the course within the time specified in the order, and the court
shall notify the department if he fails to complete the course within the
specified time;
(2) Unless the sentence is reduced pursuant to [NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 484.3794], sentence him to imprisonment for not less than 2 days nor
more than 6 months in jail, or to perform 48 hours of work for the community while dressed in distinctive garb which identifies him as having
violated the provisions of [NEv. REV. STAT. § 484.379]; and
(3) Fine him not less than $200 nor more than $1,000 .....
(b) For a second offense within 7 years, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Except as provided in [NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.3794], the court shall
sentence him to imprisonment for not less than 10 days nor more than 6
months in jail and fine him not less than $500 nor more than $1,000.
(c) For a third or subsequent offense within 7 years, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than 1 year nor
more than 6 years and must be further punished by a fine of not less
than $2,000 nor more than $5,000. An offender so imprisoned must be
segregated insofar as practicable from offenders whose crimes were violent, and must be assigned to an institution of minimum security or, if
space is available, to an honor camp, restitution center or similar facility.
Id. at §§ 484.379, 484.3792.
17 Blanton, 103 Nev. at 627, 748 P.2d at 496 (1987), aff'd sub. nom. Blanton v. City
of North Las Vegas, Nevada, 109 S. Ct. 1289 (1989).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 627, 748 P.2d at 496 (referring to NEV. REV. STAT. § 266.550 (1986)).
16 NEV. REV. STAT.
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that the Nevada statute that precluded jury trials in municipal
courts was unconstitutional.22 The City of North Las Vegas petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari challenging the district court's decision.23 The supreme court
consolidated the above cases and held that individuals charged
with the offense of DUI in Nevada do not have a federal constitutional right to jury trial.24 The Nevada court reasoned that first
time offenders face incarceration of no more than six months and
a fine of no more than $1,000.25

The United States Supreme

Court granted certiorari to examine the federal constitutional
right to trial by jury for persons charged under Nevada law with
the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. 26 In Blanton, the unanimous Court restated its previous position that certain crimes, classified as petty, are not subject to the sixth
amendment jury trial right. 27 In reviewing the maximum statu-

tory authorized incarceration period of six months, the Court
presumed that the Nevada Legislature viewed DUI as such an offense. 28 Therefore, the Court held that there is no right to a jury
22 Id. The district court determined that NEV. REV. STAT. § 266.550 (1987) violated both the federal and Nevada state constitutions. The Nevada constitutional
right to ajury trial parallels its federal counterpart, and provides, in pertinent part:
"The right of trial by Jury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate forever....
NEv. CONST. art. I, § 3.
23 Blanton, 103 Nev. at 627, 748 P.2d at 496.
24 Id. at 634, 748 P.2d at 501. Several other cases which raised the same issue
were consolidated by the Supreme Court of Nevada. In addition to Mr. Blanton,
there were six other appellants who were denied petitions for writ of mandamus by
the district court. Id. at 627, 748 P.2d at 496. The City of North Las Vegas appealed two orders for jury trial by the district court which declared NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 266.550 (1987) unconstitutional. Blanton, 103 Nev. at 627, 748 P.2d at 496. One
other petitioner filed a writ of prohibition following the district court's denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id.
25 NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.3792 (1987). See also Blanton, 103 Nev. at 633-34, 748
P.2d at 500-01. The Supreme Court of Nevada remanded Fraley's case with instructions to reinstate his conviction because he had pleaded guilty to DUI previous
to his appeal; also, the supreme court remanded Blanton's case with instructions to
proceed without a trial. Id. at 638, 748 P.2d at 503.
26 See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nevada, 109 S. Ct. 1289 (1989).
27 Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1291 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159
(1968)). The Duncan Court determined that "[i]t is doubtless true that there is a
category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment
jury trial provision and should not be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment jury
trial requirement here applied to the States. Crimes carrying possible penalties up
to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses
....
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159.
28 Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1293. ("A presumption therefore exists that the Nevada
Legislature views DUI as a 'petty' offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.").
A petty offense is defined as:
A crime, the maximum punishment for which is generally a fine or short
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trial for DUI offenders charged under Nevada law.29
This decision followed a century of struggle by the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts to distinguish between petty
and serious offenses administered under various state statutes.30
The Supreme Court has used several criteria to differentiate between petty and serious crimes. 3 In the 1888 case of Callan v.
Wilson, the United States Supreme Court examined for the first
time whether a defendant had a constitutional right to jury trial
when charged with a petty offense.3 3 The Court declared that
there is a "class of petty or minor offenses . .. which . . .may,
under the authority of Congress, be tried by the court and without a jury . . -3'Further, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court,
advanced the view that the constitutional right to a jury trial
should be interpreted in light of common law principles. 35 Charterm in jail or house of correction. In some states, it is a classification in
addition to misdemeanor and felony.
Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine. of not more than $500, or
both, is a petty offense. For purposes of determining right to jury trial,
crimes carrying more than six-month sentences are "serious crimes"
and those carrying less are "petty crimes."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1032 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). See Maita v.
Whitmore, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1974); State v. Holliday, 109 R.I. 93, 280 A.2d
333 (1971).
29 Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1291.
30 See Annotation, Distinction Between "Petty" and "Serious" Offenses for Purposes of
Federal Constitutional Right to Trial By Jury-Supreme Court Cases, 26 L. Ed. 2d 916
(1971).
31 Historically, the Supreme Court has used common law tests which examine
the nature of the crime and whether the offense is indictable at common law. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S.
65 (1904); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). In more recent cases, the Court
has emphasized the importance of the maximum statutory penalties, and especially
the lengtfi of the possible imprisonment. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In the lower federal courts, the gravity
of the totality of additional statutory penalties is considered independently of the
prison term allowed. Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1540 (1989).
32 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
33 Id. at 547.
34 Id. at 555. The Court cited various common law authorities which supported
the view that the crime involved in this case, conspiracy, was not of a petty or minor
character. Id. at 555-56.
35 Id. at 556. In Callan Justice Harlan used the nature of the crime test. Id. Further, the Court opined:
[The jury trial] provision is to be interpreted in the light of the principles which, at common law, determined whether the accused, in a given
class of cases, was entitled to be tried by a jury. It is not to be construed
as relating only to felonies, or offenses punishable by confinement in the
penitentiary. It embraces as well some classes of misdemeanors, the
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acterizing conspiracy as a grave crime, the Callan majority deter36
mined that the defendant could demand a jury trial.
After establishing that the common law approach is one
standard for defining crimes as petty or serious, the Supreme
Court went one step further in District of Columbia v. Clawans.3 7
Nearly fifty years after Callan, the Clawans Court searched for a
more objective standard and focused on the severity of the applicable penalty. 3s Recognizing society's shifting moral and social
values, 39 the Court proposed looking at the maximum allowed
penalties which Congress, as well as state statutes, impose without requiring a trial by jury.40 Basing its decision on the fact that
selling second-hand property without a license was not indictable
at common law and that the ninety-day maximum imprisonment
was not an unusual punishment for a petty offense, the Clawans
Court ruled that under the Constitution such offenders may be
tried without a jury.4 1
punishment of which involves or may involve the deprivation of the liberty of the citizen.
Id. at 549.
36 Id. at 556. The unanimous Court relied on the fact that conspiracy was an
indictable offense at common law. Id. Based on the authorities cited, conspiracy
was found to be a crime affecting the public at large, and thus defined as grave. Id.
The right to a jury trial was granted and made applicable to all levels of courts,
including municipal courts. Id. at 556-57.
The Callan approach was later applied in District of Columbia v. Colts, 282
U.S. 63 (1930) (prosecution for driving recklessly, which was an indictable offense
at common law, mandated jury trial) and Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65
(1904) (framers' intent was to exclude petty criminal offenses from requirement of
a jury trial and that constitutional rights must be interpreted based on common law
principles).
37 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
38

Id. at 625.

Id. at 627. Justice Stone expressed the Court's concern with using exclusively
common law principles predating the Constitution:
We are aware that those standards of action and of policy which find
expression in the common and statute law may vary from generation to
generation. Such change has led to the abandonment of the lash and
the stocks, and we may assume, for present purposes, that commonly
accepted views of the severity of punishment by imprisonment may become so modified that a penalty once thought to be mild may come to
be regarded as so harsh as to call for the jury trial, which the Constitution prescribes, in some cases which were triable without ajury when the
Constitution was adopted.
Id.
40 Id. at 628.
41 Id. at 625. Indirectly, the Clawans Court referred to the offense of DUI by
citing to Klinges v. Court of Common Pleas of Ocean County, 4 N.J. Misc. 7, 130 A.
601 (1925) which upheld the practice of trial without jury, given a maximum sixmonth imprisonment penalty. Clawans, 300 U.S. at 628 n.6. See also District of Co39
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In 1968, the Supreme Court expanded the importance of the
authorized penalty in setting boundaries between petty and serious offenses in Duncan v. Louisiana.42 Justice White, writing for
the majority, reasoned that a crime punishable by a maximum of
two years in prison is serious and under the sixth amendment the
accused was entitled to a jury trial.43 The Court reaffirmed the
existence of a category of petty crimes which do not mandate
sixth amendment jury trial protection.44 The Court, however,
recognized the need for a line of demarcation between petty and
serious crimes due to the absence of explicit constitutional
boundaries.4 5 Although the majority acknowledged the obligation of the judiciary to define that boundary, the Duncan Court
declined to enunciate a test to determine whether a crime is petty
or serious. 4 6 Significantly, Justice White stated that the authorized penalty constituted a major factor in determining the nature
of an offense, and the penalties attached by the legislature are a
good indication of society's view of a particular crime.4 7 Finally,
the Duncan Court referred to the need for objective criteria, such
as existing laws and practices in the nation, to guide the determination .of whether the authorized incarceration period or the severity of other punishment were sufficient in themselves to
subject a trial to the mandates of the sixth amendment.48
lumbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930) (addressing DUI in its discussion of reckless
driving).
42 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
43 Id. at 149, 161-62. The case also stands for the proposition that the sixth
amendment right to jury trial applies to the states via the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 149. The Court reasoned:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to
the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were
they to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.
Id. (footnote omitted).
44 Id. at 159.
45 Id. at 160.
46 Id. at 161. Simple battery, punishable by a prison term of up to two years, was
easily identified as serious, and therefore, the offender should be tried by a jury and
not a judge. Id. at 161-62.
47 Id. at 159-60 (citing District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628
(1937)).
48 Id. at 161. In support of this proposition, the Duncan Court referred to District of Columbia v. Clawans, and further explained:
In the federal system, petty offenses are defined as those punishable by
no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine. In 49 of the 50
States crimes subject to trial without a jury, which occasionally include
simple battery, are punishable by no more than one year in jail. Moreover, in the late 18th century in America crimes triable without a jury
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The search for a bright line test culminated in Baldwin v. New
York, 49 where the Court held that the maximum authorized penalty is the one criterion most relevant in determining the gravity
of an offense. 50 Like Duncan, the Baldwin Court utilized the congressional penalties attached to petty offenses, as well as states'
practices, as a reference point.5 ' In a plurality opinion, Justice
White set the dividing line between petty and serious crimes
based on the length of the maximum authorized prison term.5 2
Offenses carrying prison terms of more than six months could
not, injustice White's opinion, be classified as petty and the right
53
to trial by jury would, therefore, be recognized.
The Baldwin threshold continued to be applied within the
framework established by Congress in its definition of a petty offense 54 until Muniz v. Hoffman. 5' The 1975 Muniz decision
stepped out of the boundaries set at the time by 18 U.S.C. § 1,
when the Court held that a crime carrying a $10,000 fine, but no
were for the most part punishable by no more than a six-month prison
term, although there appear to have been exceptions to this rule.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). The Blanton Court, however, recognized that
"[a]lthough Congress no longer characterizes offenses as 'petty,' . . . an individual
facing a maximum prison sentence of six months or less remains subject to a maximum fine of no more than $5,000." Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nevada,
109 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (1989).
49 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (involving a misdemeanor charge, punishable by a maximum prison term of one year).
50 Id. at 68 (citing Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-161 (1968); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S.
617, 628 (1937)).
51 Id. at 70-71. Specifically, the Court cited 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) which defined
petty offenses as those subject to a maximum six months in prison and $500 fine.
Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 70-71. As further support, Baldwin relied on the fact that the
Court found only one instance where a state denied jury trial for crimes punishable
by more than six months imprisonment. Id. at 71.
52 Id. at 73-74. The Baldwin Court explained that the burden of possible imprisonment of less than six months outweighed the benefits resulting from speedy, less
costly non-jury trials. Id. at 73. Justice White then stated:
We cannot, however, conclude that these administrative conveniences,
in light of the practices that now exist in every one of the 50 States as
well as in the federal courts, can similarly justify denying an accused the
important right to trial by jury .where the possible penalty exceeds six
months imprisonment.
Id. at 73-74.
53 Id.. In a concurring opinion, Justice Black stated that the sixth amendment
and article III, § 2 of the Constitution applied to all crimes, universally guaranteeing the right to jury trial. Id. at 74-76 (Black, J., concurring).
54 See, e.g., Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
55 422 U.S. 454 (1975). The crime involved in Muniz, criminal contempt, was
subject to penalty of $10,000. Id. at 457.
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imprisonment, was not a serious offense.5 6 Consequently, the
possibility of punishment unaccompanied by imprisonment, but
exceeding the maximum fine set by Congress in its definition of a
petty crime, did not automatically entitle the accused to a jury
trial. 57 Significantly, the Muniz Court noted the drastically different consequences attached to incarceration as compared to punishment by fines only.5" The Muniz Court failed to enunciate a
clear test for determining the right to a jury trial. The Court posited, however, that the congressional definition was not the only
reference point in defining petty and serious crimes, and emphasized the significance of the maximum authorized period of incarceration.5" In dissent, Justice Douglas reaffirmed the position he
set forth in Baldwin that all criminal prosecutions demand the
sixth amendment jury trial guarantee, regardless of the penalties
involved. 60
Recognizing the conflict which existed in both federal 6 I and
state courts 6 2 in categorizing DUI as a petty or serious offense,
56 Id. at 477. Muniz also reaffirmed the Court's view that criminal contempt may
constitutionally be tried without a jury. Id. at 475.
57 Id. at 476. This Court's view is consistent with the Duncan proposition that
setting the boundary between petty and serious crimes requires "attaching different
consequences to events which, when they lie near the line, actually differ very little." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968).
58 Muniz, 422 U.S. at 477.
59 Id. at 476-77. For a discussion of Muniz, see Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Criminal
Procedure-CriminalContempt-The Right to Trial byJury-Muniz v. Hoffman, 1976 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 549.
60 Muniz, 422 U.S. at 480 & n.6 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Codispoti v.
Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Frank
v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969)). See also Kaye, supra note 2 (espousing the
idea that the framers also intended the universal guarantee of jury trial to all
offenses).
61 See Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1540 (1989). In Landry the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
focused on the offense of driving while intoxicated and concluded that this crime
was not a serious one for purposes of sixth amendment trial by jury provisions. Id.
at 1202. The Landrn defendant faced possible maximum penalties of six months
incarceration, a $500 fine, enrollment in a substance-abuse program, and a sixtyday license suspension. Id. at 1203 & n.l, 1216 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14:98, 32:414 (West 1984)).
62 If afforded constitutional or statutory power, states may grant jury trial rights
in all criminal prosecutions, including petty offenses. Id. Supreme Court Justices
hold varied opinions on the issue of whether states are bound by the petty offense
doctrine, as noted by Judge Garwood in Landry:
Indeed, Justices Black and Douglas were of the view that the Sixth
Amendment and Article III, Section 2, made no distinction between
"petty" and "serious" crimes. ChiefJustice Burger was of the view that,
at least for purposes of application of the Sixth Amendment to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the jury trial guarantee extended
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the Supreme Court in Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nevada, 63
addressed the issue of whether a person charged with DUI under
Nevada law had a federal constitutional right to jury trial.6 4 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Marshall reviewed the penalties attached to the first-time offense of DUI under Nevada's
drunk driving statute. 6 5 The Court noted that the statute provided for imprisonment of a maximum term of six months, or
forty-eight hours of community service.6 6 Additional penalties
for each case included: (i) fines of no more than $1,000; (ii)
ninety days revocation of some driving privileges; and (iii)
mandatory attendance at an alcohol education course. 6 7 Because
the maximum authorized incarceration period did not classify
DUI as a severe offense, the Court held that DUI offenders were
not entitled to a jury trial.6 8
After acknowledging the existence of a category of petty
crimes not mandating a jury trial, 6 9 the majority summarized the
criteria which is used in determining the gravity of a crime. 0
The Blanton Court reviewed the common law tests dating back to
1888 in Callan, but focused on the Duncan and Baldwin era which
signaled the switch to more objective criteria. 7 1 The Court
agreed with the Duncan and Baldwin views and determined that
only to "serious" crimes, which could include those punishable by a
year's imprisonment. Justice Harlan, who had dissented in Duncan,
thought "it appropriate to draw the line at six months in federal cases,
although" he "would not encumber the States by this requirement."
Justice Stewart likewise dissented, stating that he "substantially
agree[d]" with Justice Harlan.
Id. at 1206 n.l 1 (citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970)). The court also
noted that the majority of the states do not follow the petty offense doctrine, but
concluded that thirty-two jurisdictions do classify DUI according to the Supreme
Court's definition of petty offenses. Id. at 1219.
63 109 S. Ct. 1289 (1989).
64 Id. at 1291. The Supreme Court relied on Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) which held that the sixth amendment right to trial byjury is applied to the
states via the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at
1291 n.4.
65 Id. at 1291 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 484.379, 484.3792 (1987)).
66

Id.

67 Justice Marshall also noted that the statute permits increased penalties for

repeat offenders, including imprisonment of one to six years for the third DUI offense. Id. at 1291 & n.2 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.3792(1) (c) (1987)).
68 Id. at 1292-93.
69 Id. at 1291 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); and Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540
(1888)).
70 Id. at 1291-92.
71 Id.
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the severity of the maximum penalty authorized was the most relevant factor indicating the legislature's and society's view of a
particular crime. 72 Further, Justice Marshall stressed that the judiciary must defer to the legislature's judgement of the gravity of
a crime as reflected in the maximum penalty allowed. 7' The
Blanton Court expanded the meaning of the word "penalty" in
relation to the definition of crimes as petty or serious. 4 Justice
Marshall emphasized that the additional penalties attached to the
maximum prison term also reflected the legislature's view of the
crime.7 5 The Court explained, however, that while additional
penalties such as fines and probation are significant, incarceration is still the most important factor because of its infringement
on one's liberty.7 6
The majority agreed with the bright line test enunciated in
Baldwin which established that a defendant is entitled to a jury
trial if the sanctions included a penalty of more than six months
incarceration. 77 The Blanton Court, however, clarified that less
than six months incarceration, while not automatically qualifying
an offense as petty, creates a presumption to that effect. 7 8 To
assure that the constitutional right to a jury trial could not be
denied simply on the basis of the six-month test, Justice Marshall
emphasized that the additional statutory penalties must also be
considered. 79 Admitting that these standards are not precise, the
Court examined both the length of the prison sentence imposed
on first-time DUI offenders, as well as the severity of the other
possible penalties.8 0 Because the first-time DUI offense carried a
72 Id at 1292 (citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970)). The Blanton
majority agreed with Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1540 (1989) (emphasizing importance of the maximum penalty assigned
to crimes).
73 See Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1292.
74 Id.
75 Id. See United States v. Jenkins, 780 F.2d 472 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1161 (1986).
76 Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1292. The unanimous Court reasoned that "[i]ndeed,
because incarceration is an 'intrinsically different' form of punishment ... it is the
most powerful indication of whether an offense is 'serious.' " Id. (citing Muniz v.
Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975)).
77 Id. The Court noted that in situations where there is no maximum penalty set
by the legislature, the relevant factor is the penalty actually imposed. Id. at 1292
n.6. See also supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing Baldwin).
78 Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1293.
79 Id. Justice Marshall explained that "[i]n performing this analysis, only penalties resulting from state action, e.g., those mandated by statute or regulation,
should be considered." Id. 1293 n.8 (citing Note, supra, note 5, at 149-50).
80 Id. at 1293-94.
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maximum of six months authorized prison term, the Court concluded that the Nevada Legislature deemed this offense to be
petty.8 ' Justice Marshall rejected petitioners' arguments that the
alternative forty-eight hours of community service, the possible
license suspension, and the $1,000 fine, were so severe as to trigger the sixth amendment right to jury trial.82
The Blanton Court briefly mentioned that offenders must
perform community service while wearing clothing which identifies them as DUI violators and summarily concluded that the embarrassment of wearing a special outfit is less burdensome than a
six-month jail term.8 3 Such form of branding, however, may be
viewed as outrageous by modern society standards and may exceed the federal
constitutional limit on cruel and unusual
84
punishment.

The Supreme Court has interpreted the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the eighth amendment as a limitation on
the states' power to punish.8 5 The clause extends its protection
against more than just barbaric forms of punishment:86 "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man. "87 While declaring that many types of
punishment such as fines, imprisonment, and even death may be
acceptable depending on the crime, the Court has held that penalties outside traditional forms are subject to scrutiny under the
eighth amendment.8

8

In Weems v. United States,8 9 the Court recog-

nized that there is no precise definition for cruel and unusual
Id.
Id. The Court was not impressed by the prohibition on plea bargaining, or
the ninety-day license suspension which may in fact run concurrently with the
prison sentence. Id. at 1293. Further, the Court stressed that the "$1,000 fine, ....
is well below the $5,000 level set by Congress in its most recent definition of a
'petty' offense .... " Id. at 1294 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1982 & Supp. IV)).
83 Id. at 1293 & n.10.
84 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII dictates: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." The eighth
amendment has been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962). See also
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 493 (1977) (commenting on the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment as applied to state action).
85 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (expatriation for desertion).
86 Id. at 101. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (life sentence without
possibility of parole triggered by defendant's seventh non-violent felony).
81
82

87 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
88 Id. at 101.
89 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (involving

a 15-year prison term combined with additional penalties for falsifying official documents).
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punishment and more importantly that any definition varies with
the times as "public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice. '"90 The Supreme Court then stated that the eighth
amendment mandates punishment proportional to the crime
committed."'
The Blanton Court could have, sua sponte, considered whether
the branding of an offender as a drunk driver, while performing
community service, would constitute a grossly disproportionate
penalty for the first offense of DUL 2 To achieve the level of constitutional deprivation, a penalty "must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and "the punishment must
90 Id. at 378. AsJustice Brennan noted, the protection afforded by the Constitution depends on "the adaptability of its great principles to cope with the problems
of a developing America." Brennan, supra note 84, at 495.
The concept of a progressive interpretation has been also espoused in Trop,
356 U.S. at 101 (stating that the scope of the eighth amendment is not static);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976) (requiring a
flexible and dynamic interpretation of the eighth amendment in line with contemporary standards of decency).
91 Weems, 217 U.S. at 367. Justice McKenna found the punishment in Weems excessively cruel and unusual, and therefore, in violation of the Constitution. Id. at
382. Justice McKenna stated:
Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have formed their
conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from
the practice of the American commonwealths, and believe that it is a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to offense.
Id. at 367. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-90 (1983); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-73 (1976); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962). For a discussion of the proportionality doctrine see Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Taming of the Proportionality
Test, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 722 (1976).
Substantial development of the proportionality doctrine has also taken place at
state and lower federal court levels. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 578 F.2d
256, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1978) (punishment is unconstitutional when grossly out of
proportion to severity of crime and when it shocks the sense of justice); Adams v.
Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 635-36 (7th Cir. 1973) (disproportionate punishment imposed in or outside the prison is unconstitutional); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.
Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Ca. 1966) (excessive sanctions shock the conscience in light
of current concepts of decency).
State courts have also adopted the proportionality doctrine. See, e.g., State v.
Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 455 A.2d 1074 (1983); Schmidt v. State of Nevada, 94 Nev.
665, 584 P.2d 695 (1978); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr.
217 (1972); State v. Muessig, 198 N.J. Super. 197, 486 A.2d 924 (App. Div. 1985),
cert. denied, 101 NJ. 237, 501 A.2d 912 (1985).
92 In previous cases the Court has proposed several objective criteria for its
analysis of possible violations of the last clause of the eighth amendment, including:
"(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
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not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."9 3
In determining whether disproportionality exists, courts have
looked to the public attitude towards a given crime and its
punishment. 4
The DUI offense has met in recent years with great public
concern. The dangers involved in driving while intoxicated have
been recognized by courts as well as groups such as "Mothers
Against Drunk Driving" and "Students Against Drunk Driving." 9 5 Intoxicated drivers are currently viewed as a serious dan9 6

ger to themselves and to all others using the public roadways.
In light of the public sentiment against DUI offenders it is doubtful that the Supreme Court would find the clothing requirement
of the Nevada statute grossly disproportionate with the severity
of the crime.
The Supreme Court has, however, supported the view that
punishment must also not be senseless or unnecessary.9 7 Lower
federal courts and state courts have also affirmed that punishment which serves no penological aim may violate the Constitution. 98 Therefore, the clothing requirement may be construed as
93 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
94 Id. (contemporary values regarding the punishment imposed are relevant to
the application of the eighth amendment).
95 United States v. Jenkins, 780 F.2d 472, 474 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1161 (1986).
The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, has expressed in very strong
words the public policy against driving while intoxicated. State v. Tischio, 107 NJ.
504, 527 A.2d 388 (1987). Referring to the New Jersey statute, NJ. STAT. ANN.
§§ 39:4-50 (West 1986), the court stated that the purpose of the statute is to eliminate drunk-drivers from the state's roadways and "to curb the senseless havoc and
destruction caused by intoxicated drivers." Id. at 512, 527 A.2d at 392-93. Justice
Handler stated:
The necessity for stringent drunk driving laws has received widespread
and nearly unanimous support in an increasing crescendo in the last
several decades throughout this nation. The increasing slaughter on
our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield, and exceeds the death
total of all our wars. Traffic deaths in the United States commonly exceed 50,000 annually and approximately one-half of these fatalities are
alcohol related. Drastic remedies were necessary to reduce the senseless carnage on our highway.
Id., 527 A.2d at 392 (quoting State v. D'Agostino, 203 NJ. Super. 69, 72, 495 A.2d
915, 917 (Law Div. 1984)). See State v. Fearick, 69 NJ. 31, 350 A.2d 227 (1976);
State v. Housman, 131 NJ. Super. 478, 330 A.2d 598 (App. Div. 1974).
96 See Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1220 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1540 (1989) (GarzaJ., dissenting); Tischio, 107 NJ. at 512, 527 A.2d at 392.
97 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
98 At the lower federal court level it has been held that sentences are excessive if
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a senseless form of public humiliation. The Nevada Legislature's
effort to curb the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol
would not be greatly enhanced by this rather peculiar and apparently unnecessary sanction. Consequently, such punishment may
be found unconstitutional under the "cruel and unusual" clause
of the eighth amendment.
By focusing strictly on first-time offenders, the Supreme
Court in Blanton left open the issue of whether the Constitution
requires that a repeat offender have the right to a trial by jury.99
Additionally, the Court refused to consider other states' statutory
penalties for driving while intoxicated by narrowly focusing on
whether the State of Nevada violated the Constitution by denying
the petitioners' requests for jury trials. 0 0 Justice Marshall concluded that the sum of all the statutory penalties attached to the
first offense of driving under the influence of alcohol did not suggest the legislature's intent to deem such an offense as serious.' 0 '
Therefore, first-time offenders charged under the Nevada statentitled to a jury trial under the sixth
ute, 10 2 are not
3
0
amendment.'

A century after Callan v. Wilson, the Supreme Court continues to distinguish between serious and petty crimes for purposes
of the sixth amendment right to jury trial.' 04 The Court has unithere is a purposeless infliction of pain and suffering. United States v. Washington,
578 F.2d 256, 258 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978). Sentences may also be characterized as
violating the Constitution when their severity goes beyond accomplishing legitimate penal aims. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Ca. 1966). Finally, in Mickle v. Henricks, 262 F. Supp. 687 (D.C. Nev. 1918) the district court
held that the Constitution also proscribes degrading and humiliating sanctions
which fail to accomplish the penal purpose of "resumption of upright and selfrespecting life." Id. at 691.
At the state court level the concept of equating excessive punishment with the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering has also been accepted.
See State v. Vaccaro, 121 R.I. 788, 403 A.2d 649 (1979); Serna v. Hodges, 89 N.M.
351, 552 P.2d 787 (1976).
99 Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nevada, 109 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 & n.12
(1989).
100 Id. at 1294 n.11. The Court relied on Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987)
which held that the issue of whether a state's practice violates the Constitution is
not resolved by cataloguing the other states' practices. Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1294
n. ll.
11 Id. at 1294.
102 See NEv. REV. STAT. § 484.379 (1987).
103 Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1294.
104 For a discussion of the Callan decision, see supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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formly held that certain crimes mandate a trial by jury.'0 5 Offenses which carry a maximum authorized prison term of more
than six months exceed the Baldwin v. New York threshold, and
therefore, can be easily identified as serious, triggering sixth
amendment protection. 10 6 Those offenses carrying less than a
six-month imprisonment period, however, are difficult to categorize. 10 7 Both federal and state courts have shown deference to
the legislature's view of crimes as reflected in the statutory penalties, but the burden remains on the courts to determine if a crime
is petty and whether the right to jury trial may be denied.' 8 This
process demands the insertion of the judiciary's own moral and
social values, and thus, it has resulted in unclear and inconsistent
standards.10 9
The more recent Supreme Court decisions of Baldwin and
Muniz have de-emphasized common law tests in reviewing the nature of a crime as well as whether the offense was indictable at
common law. 1 10 Instead, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have focused on the statutory penalties attached to a
crime."' The Blanton decision followed this'trend by stressing
that in addition to the maximum authorized prison term, courts
must also examine the additional penalties attached to the violation. In regard to the particular offense of DUI, the Court in
Blanton quite subjectively attached little significance to such pen1 12
alties as license suspension and mandatory community service.'
Although the Court dismissed the requirement that distinctive
garb be worn while performing community service, this form of
punishment may trigger the protection of the eighth amendment.
105 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
106 See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
107 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussing statutory penalties
which may attach to the DUI offense in addition to imprisonment).
108 See Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1293.
109 See Note, supra note 5. The author posited that "[a]llowing public attitudes
and the courts' moral judgments to influence the decision creates an undesirable
inconsistency, because what one court or community considers a serious offense
may be a petty offense in the next town." Id. at 150 n.180.
11o See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974).

111 See, e.g., Blanton, 109 S. Ct. 1289; Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975);
Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969); Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1540 (1989).
112 Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1293-94. For example, in Blanton the "DUI offender
may be ordered to perform 48 hours of community service dressed in clothing
identifying him as a DUI offender." Id. at 1293.
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The ban against cruel and unusual punishment protects individuals against purposeless sanctions such as public humiliation.
Because state statutes vary in respect to the penalties attached to DUI, the lack of an objective standard makes it very
difficult to foresee whether a particular DUI offense should be
tried by jury. Even more alarming is the fact that the Blanton
Court remained silent on the safety issues and the economic
losses related to driving while intoxicated." 3 The Court could
have determined that the crime is a malum in se offense, and therefore, the fundamental right to trial by jury should have been
granted regardless of the penalties involved." 4 The Blanton
Court, however, held that the Nevada Legislature did not intend
to classify DUI as a serious offense. Further, the Court's decision
in Blanton, by its own admission, is narrowly applicable to the Nevada statute alone. Consequently, the search for more objective
criteria and consistent standards to determine the seriousness of
this crime must continue.
The right to a jury trial, as provided by the Constitution, is a
fundamental right which should not be jeopardized by a subjective definition of crimes as petty or serious. Additionally, the administrative convenience of speedy and inexpensive trials should
not strip individuals of their constitutional protections." 5 Decisions such as Blanton necessarily affect the administration of the
criminal justice system. The courts, however, should be liberal in
enforcing the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights against
state action.1 6 In the words of Justice Brennan, "there exists in
modern America the necessity for protecting all of us from arbitrary action by governments more powerful and more pervasive
than any in our ancestors' time."-1 7 Therefore, in order to assure
that the right to a jury trial is not indiscriminately denied, the
legislature should clearly define petty and serious crimes, or the
judiciary should enunciate a precise and consistent standard.
Florina A. Moldovan
''3
See Landry, 840 F.2d at 1220 (Garza, J., dissenting). The Landry dissent rightfully argued that DUI is viewed today as a serious problem with grave consequences
flowing from driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Id.
114 Id. A malum in se is defined as "[a] wrong in itself; an act or case involving
illegality from the very nature of the transaction, upon principles of natural, moral,
and public law." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 865 (5th ed. 1979). See Grindstaff v.
Tennessee, 214 Tenn. 58, 377 S.W.2d 921 (1964).
115 Blanton, 109 S. Ct. at 1292-93.
116 See Brennan, supra note 5, at 493-95.
117 Id. at 495.

